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FARM DEBT IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES: LESSONS FOR TAJIKISTAN 
Zvi Lerman and David Sedik 
 
Farms in Tajikistan currently face a severe debt crisis. This is part of a more general problem, as 
many  transition  countries  in  the  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  (CIS)  have  been 
struggling  with  farm  debt  overhangs.  Debt  resolution  discussions  have  been  going  on  in 
Tajikistan  for  a  number  of  years,  but  the  general  lack  of  political  will  and  the  prevailing 
unwillingness to make radical changes in the core of the inherited collective farm structure have 
typically resulted in temporary ad hoc solutions that fail to treat underlying causes.  
 
The debt  crisis  in  Tajikistan’s  agriculture has been  caused by a combination of two  factors 
typical of such situations in many countries: (a) the inability of the farms to make a profit under 
current  conditions and (b) continued lending by the banks  to cotton producers regardless  of 
reduced  payment  capacity  and  lack  of  credit-worthiness.  The  accumulation  of  farm  debt  in 
Tajikistan is traceable to pervasive government intervention in both financing and production 
decisions, which has led to soft budget constraints and moral hazard behavior. In addition, the 
government  has  failed  to  create  a  conducive  environment  for  radical  restructuring  of  the 
inherited farm system and thus prevented improvements in profitability and efficiency.  
 
The  purpose  of  the  paper  is  to  inform  the  debate  around  the  issue  of  cotton  farm  debt  in 
Tajikistan by studying the experience of other countries that had to  contend with farm debt 
overhangs  in  the  1980s  and  the  1990s.  Five  CIS  transition  countries  (Belarus,  Kazakhstan, 
Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine) and one market economy (Israel) are studied. The comparative 
analysis shows that the farm debt issue is not strictly a transition economy phenomenon. The 
problem can occur in market economies (e.g., Israel) if the state pursues policies directed toward 
the expansion of farm production without heed to creditworthiness of the farms and if the farm 
structure is incompatible with profitability and efficiency criteria. The basic reasons that led to 
debt  accumulation  in  CIS  and  in  Israel  remain  valid  to  this  day,  and  the  policy  solutions 
implemented in these countries are relevant for Tajikistan.   
 
An important common feature of farm debt in both transition and market economies – CIS and 
Israel – is that the problem encompassed a whole economic-social sector in each of the countries 
involved. As a result, it was unpracticable to seek standard debt resolution through liquidation 
and bankruptcy of the insolvent farms, as the entire agriculture was insolvent and traditional 
approaches would involve an unacceptable social cost for the rural population as a whole. The 
situation in Tajikistan may not have reached this dramatic level yet, but the farm debt burden is 
large  and  widely  dispersed.  The  search  for  farm  debt  resolution  mechanisms  in  Tajikistan 
therefore  should purposely  consider non-bankruptcy mechanisms  that  will help  preserve and 
nurture the fragile fabric of rural society. The farm debt resolution program implemented in 
Moldova  in  1998-2000,  engineering  debt  repayment  through  the  sale  of  collectively  owned 
assets to the government and compensation of commercial creditors with long-term government 
bonds, provides an example of a particularly appropriate mechanism that could be applied in 
Tajikistan. The Israeli experience with rescuing the farm sector in the 1990s through a non-
bankruptcy mechanism that forced banks, commercial creditors, and the government to share the 
burden  of  outstanding  debt  writeoffs  and  instituted  strict  monitoring  tools  to  prevent 
accumulation of new debt is also highly relevant for Tajikistan’s situation.    3 
 
Cotton Debt Crisis in Tajikistan
1 
 
Tajikistan’s agriculture today consists of three main farm structures: agricultural enterprises and 
collective dekhan (peasant) farms, the successors of former Soviet collectives that had dominated 
Tajikistan’s agriculture before mid-1990s, and the booming sector of individual dekhkan farms, 
which  are  rapidly  overtaking  the  traditional  collective  farms.  Agricultural  enterprises  and 
collective dekhkan farms in Tajikistan are facing a severe debt crisis, which has been mainly 
documented for cotton producers, but is a general problem of structurally unreformed farms that 
have kept the traditional collective form of organization.  
 
The financial performance of agricultural enterprises in Tajikistan has deteriorated drastically 
over time.
2  In aggregate agricultural enterprises in Tajikistan have run net losses since 1998, and 
the number of farm enterprises reporting losses increased from 27% in 1997 to 51% in 2001. 
Despite worsening economic performance, bank lending to agricultural enterprises has increased 
every year since 1991, so that their share in total bank debt in the economy rose from less than 
10% in 1991-93 to more than 60% in 2002-05. Almost the entire bank debt in farms (more than 
95%) is short-term debt for working capital financing. In addition to short-term bank debt farms 
are also indebted to input suppliers, which have accounted for more than one -third of farm debt 
in recent years. Thus, in 2005, farms owed 500 million somoni in accounts payable to suppliers 
on top of 750 million somoni that they owed to the banks, approximately $400 million.   
 
The reasons for the accumulation of cotton farm debt go back to the system for funding the 
cotton crop that was set up by presidential decree in 1998. The system was designed with the 
objective  of  alleviating  the  working-capital  difficulties  of  cotton-growing  farmers.  Private 
investors  (―futurists‖)  were  designated  to  conclude  contracts  with  cotton  farmers,  which 
specified the inputs investors would supply to farms and the amount of cotton they would receive 
for their services. It has been repeatedly argued that ―investors‖ grossly overcharged farmers for 
financing  and  inputs  delivered,  and  underpaid  for  cotton  received.  These  pricing  problems 
combined with intrinsically inefficient farm production led to steady increase of indebtedness.  
 
The debt of cotton farms to private investors increased steadily and continuously from less than 
$50 million in 1999 to $400 million in the end of 2007.
3  In addition, farms have debt to the 
budget, tax authorities, and for utilities. According to the National Bank of Tajikistan, this non-
investor  debt  totaled  approximately  $62.2  million  as  of  January  2006,  and  that  after  the 
                                                 
1 This section draws on the authors’ report The Economic Effects of Land Reform in Tajikistan (October 2008), 
prepared as part of the EC/FAO Food Security Programme—Phase II: Food Security Information for Action and 
published in Budapest and Dushanbe (in English and Russian). 
2 The financial performance statistics in this paragraph are from two official sources: Tajikistan: 15 Years of State 
Independence, statistical yearbook, State Statistical Committee, Dushanbe, 2006, pp. 473-474, 478-479, 485; 
Agriculture in Tajikistan 2002, statistical yearbook, State Statistical Committee, Dushanbe, 2002. 
3 Van Atta, Don (2008): ―The failure of land reform in Tajikistan,‖ Paper for the 13th Annual World Convention of 
the Association for the Study of Nationalities, Columbia University, New York (April 11). Based on data from IMF 
(1999) and National Bank of Tajikistan (2000-2007).   4 
government had written off $38.5 million in December 2003.
4  In total, the farm debt to investors 
and non-investor creditors accumulated by January 2006 was about equal to the total amount the 
World Bank and the Asia n Development Bank, taken together, had lent and given Tajikistan 
since they began operations in the country.  
 
Recent survey results
5 illustrate that the primary source of financing for cotton producers is the 
―futurists,‖ non-bank private financiers that advance farm inputs in exchange for the cotton crop.  
Practically all cotton  growers  among family dehkan farms  (90%) sign  forward contracts  for 
cotton deliveries, and again practically all of them (83%) sign up with ―futurists‖ (FAO 2008 
survey). For small farmers, investors (―futurists‖) financed (sometimes in combination with other 
sources) about 70% of the production costs for the 2007 cotton harvest (Table 1). Commercial 
banks contributed another 12% of production costs, while 14% was self-financing.  Most farmers 
(72% of the respondents) used a single source of financing, which in more than half the cases 
was the investor. Self-financing is the second-ranking source, reported by 30% of farmers who 
finance from a single source (ADB 2008 survey).   
 
Table 1. Cotton financing sources for small farmers in 2007 
Financing source  Share of 2007 production 
costs financed from this 
source, % (n=323) 
Farmers resorting to this 
source, % (n=323)* 
Farmers  financing from a 
single source, % (n=233) 
Investors  68  62  54 
Banks  12  14  11 
Self-financing  14  46  30 
Other  6  9  5 
Total  100  --  100 
*Numbers add up to more than 100% because farmers use multiple sources of financing. 
Source: ADB 2008 survey. 
 
In general, larger farms have to turn to investors at least for part of their financing, while the 
smaller farms rely on self-financing. Among farmers with a single source of financing (Table 2), 
those with least land (11 hectares under cotton) rely on self-financing, while those with most 
land  (46  hectares  under  cotton)  finance  through  investors  (the  differences  between  the  two 
extreme groups are statistically significant). The same general tendency is observed when we 
compare the area in all farms that use investor financing (whether as a single source or as one of 
multiple sources) with the area in all farms that use self-financing: the average land under cotton 
in investor-financed farms is 44 hectares, while the average land under cotton in self-financed 
farms is 20 hectares (bank-financed farms fall in the middle with 40 hectares).  
 
Table 2. Relationship between financing modes and land 
  Area in cotton, ha  Total cropped area, ha 
Single financing source  33  48 
Multiple financing sources  36  64 
For farms with a single financing source:     
  Investor  46*  64* 
                                                 
4 EuropeAid Project on Support to the Development, Implementation and Evaluation of Agricultural Policy of the 
Republic of Tajikistan, ―Notes for a Strategy for the Agricultural Sector of Tajikistan‖ (processed, 2007), pp. 29, 49, 
50.  
5 This paper makes use of the results from two surveys conducted by FAO and by ADB in 2008. For details see the 
report cited in footnote 1.   5 
  Bank  30  39 
  Self-financed  11*  19* 
All financing sources:**     
  Investor  44  67 
  Bank  40  76 
  Self-financed  20  33 
*Difference between investor-financed and self-financed farms statistically significant by both Anova and Wilcoxon 
tests. **Differences cannot be tested for statistical significance because of data structure. 
Source: ADB 2008 survey. 
 
Two main reasons appear for the be responsible for lack of profitability and the accumulation of 
debt among cotton farms – primarily collective dehkan farms, but also many of the remaining 
farm  enterprises:  inefficiency  due  to  inadequate  reorganization  and  continued  lending  by 
―futurists‖  to  farms  irrespective  of  the  ability  of  farms  to  service  debt.    The  government’s 
insistence on setting targets for cotton production (so-called ―state orders‖) is a major reason for 
both lending without due regard to debt repayment capability and an incentive for farms to use 
the services of ―futurists‖.  The state deprived Tajik farmers of freedom of choice in decisions 
involving the product mix on their farms, locking them into a rigid cropping and production 
pattern. Charged with the responsibility of meeting state orders for cotton, district authorities 
(hukumats), in addition to enforcing cotton sowing targets, began to demand that farmers accept 
financing by private ―investors‖ outside the banking system in the guise of alleviating working 
capital problems. The dehkan farmers had to comply with these ―recommendations‖ because the 
hukumats have the power to confiscate land for ―irrational‖ use (which includes non-compliance 
with state orders).  
 
Policies to address debt accumulation in Tajikistan 
 
Farm debt resolution is a national priority in Tajikistan not only because of the burden it imposes 
on the financial system, but also because it constitutes an obstacle to the implementation of farm 
restructuring. The goal of moving toward a market-oriented agriculture with higher productivity 
and more efficient resource use requires a radical change in farm structure and operation, as the 
successors of large collective and state farms differ radically from the farms that actually exist in 
market  economies.  Farm  debt  is  a  serious  constraint  for  the  implementation  of  meaningful 
restructuring  and  resource  privatization  in  CIS  agriculture  in  general  and  in  Tajikistan  in 
particular. First, it prevents the exit of individual farm members from the collective structure, 
because they are responsible for a portion of the debt and may not be able to borrow on their own 
through  financial  institutions  to  meet  the  operating  needs  of  their  new  farms.  Second,  debt 
obstructs restructuring of the traditional collective enterprises into new viable entities, because 
the designated shareowners – the members of the farm enterprise – face uncertainty regarding the 
net value of the assets they potentially control and thus the creditworthiness of the new legal 
entities being created from the collective.  
 
Several decrees and resolutions have addressed the problem of cotton farm debt in Tajikistan 
since  2003,  proposing  to  no  avail  debt  settlement  mechanisms,  appropriate  accounting 
techniques, and timetables for debt rescheduling and repayment. The growing farm debt problem 
stimulated the government of Tajikistan to issue Government Resolution 111 entitled a ―Plan of 
Measures for Cotton Farm Debt Resolution in the Republic of Tajikistan for 2007-2009.‖  This 
resolution included policy measures aimed at creating a better enabling environment for cotton   6 
producers, such as a provision prohibiting district authorities from confiscating land for use ―not 
according to purpose‖ and provisions guaranteeing no interference in farmers’ freedom to farm.  
The document also called for the ―design [of] procedures on farm debt resolution‖ by April 2007.  
 
The enabling measures outlined in Government Resolution 111 have not been fully enacted and 
no procedures to resolve the problem of farm debt have been issued so far. In fact, many of the 
provisions of Resolution 111 are effectively abrogated by the latest version of the Law ―On Land 
Use Planning‖ passed in January 2008. An interventionist streak runs through the entire law 
indicating  that  the  government  intends  to  continue  its  intervention  in  farm-level  production 
decisions through the tools of land use planning.  
 
Experience with Farm Debt in CIS
6 
 
The rapid accumulation of farm debt in Tajikistan since 1999-2000 looks like a repetition of the 
previous scenario that unfolded in other CIS countries between 1992 and 1998. As in Tajikistan, 
farm debt accumulation in other CIS countries was driven by two main factors: (a) inadequate 
farm profitability and (b) pervasive soft budget constraints made possible by government policies 
and irresponsible lender behavior. 
 
Nature of farm debt and repayment capacity 
 
The farm debt situation in the CIS had two characteristic features: first, the real debt of the farm 
sector  rose  steady  since  1990  (Figure  1);  second,  the  term  structure  of  debt  shifted  almost 
entirely toward short-term, current liabilities (Figure 2). The old long-term debt, never a major 
component of farm liabilities, was completely wiped out by the galloping inflation of the early 
1990s, and in the absence of appropriate indexation mechanisms all sources of new long-term 
lending evaporated at that time. The growing farm debt in the region was thus generally new and 
fairly recent debt, not debt inherited from the Soviet period. 
 
Standard financial ratios calculated for the CIS countries from  aggregate balance sheets and 
income statements of the farm sector reveal deterioration of financial situation as debt levels 
increased over time. Yet the values of most ratios were not dramatically high. Thus the ratio of 
debt to total assets and even the ratio of debt to current assets were both comfortably less than 1 
(Table 3). This means that, in conventional terms, the CIS farms were not bankrupt at all: they 
had enough assets (even only current assets) to cover the outstanding debt with a sufficient safety 
margin. The ratio of debt to sales measuring the ability to repay debt from current revenues was 
not alarming either (Table 3): farm debt was of the order of annual sales, which means that one 
year of sales revenues was sufficient to repay the entire farm debt in CIS. Debt levels of one 
credit-year are not regarded as catastrophic anywhere in the world.
7  
 
                                                 
6This section is based on a regional farm debt study carried out in 1999-2000 in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, 
Russia, and Ukraine.  The results were summarized in Z. Lerman, C. Csaki, and S. Sotnikov, Farm Debt in CIS: A 
Cross-Country Analysis, World Bank, Washington, DC (2001), with supporting country background papers.  
7 The numbers in Table 3 are based on sector averages for each country, and do not allow for the distribution of 
farms over the entire spectrum of ratios. Yet tentative distributional analyses indicate that the percentage of farm 
enterprises with critically high indebtedness levels (relative to assets and sales) was on the whole very low. 










Figure 1. Real debt per farm (volume index 














Figure 2. Term structure of farm debt. 
 
Table 3. Selected financial ratios: average for four CIS countries (excluding Kazakhstan) 
  1990  1994  1998  US (1998) 
Debt to sales  0.16  0.49  1.20  0.40 
Debt to total assets  0.10  0.17  0.15  n.a. 
Debt to current assets  0.28  0.60  0.89  0.35 
Debt to liquid current assets  0.58  2.27  4.27  1.50 
 
All four basic ratios measuring the capacity of farms to repay their debt – the ratio of debt to 
sales, the ratio of debt to total assets, the ratio of debt to current assets (including inventories), 
and the ratio of debt to liquid current assets (the quick or acid ratio excluding all inventories) – 
increase over time, which is a definite sign of rising indebtedness (Table 3). Yet while the values 
of the first three ratios are not particularly alarming by world standards, the ratio of debt to liquid 
current assets rises to stratospheric levels. On average in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova 
this ratio rose from 0.6 in 1990 to over 4 in 1998. This means that the liquid assets, when 
converted into cash at their full book value, would cover less than 25% of current farm debt. The 
corresponding ratio for US farms was 1.5, i.e., liquid assets of US farms cover 67% of current 
debt. Moreover, for US farms all three ratios remained perfectly steady over the years: there was 
no deterioration in the solvency of US farms, while CIS farms have become much less solvent 
over the decade of transition.  
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Term Structure of Farm Debt








Long-term  8 
While all four ratios point to increasing indebtedness, it is particularly the ratio of debt to liquid 
assets that confirms the existence of a serious problem in CIS farms: farms can only repay a 
small fraction of their debt from cash and near-cash reserves. To repay the bulk of their debt, 
they have to rely on sale of inventories and liquidation of fixed assets, which is a proposition 
with dubious and uncertain outcomes even in established market economies. 
 
Why is there a contradiction between the ratio of debt to liquid assets, which presents a grim 
picture of debt repayment capacity, and the ratio of debt to sales, which optimistically suggests 
that debt can be repaid from just one year of sales revenue? The reason, quite simply, is that farm 
sales in CIS do not produce profits. The proportion of farms reporting losses had increased 
markedly since 1994, and well over 60% of farm enterprises were unprofitable in the late 1990s. 
Sales revenue was entirely absorbed by wages and other production costs, and farms were losing 
on average almost 40% on each ruble of sales revenue. Farm operations did not generate net 
income that could be used to repay debt, however small.  
 
Debt and profitability 
 
Declining  profits  (and  increasing  losses)  appear  to  be  the  major  determinant  of  debt 
accumulation in CIS farms. The level of debt increased in inverse proportion to the level of 
profits: as profits declined and losses grew the real level of farm debt increased. This result was 
observed both for the entire farm sector over time and across thousands of farms in one year 
(1998). So the debt problem in CIS was clearly attributable to lack of profitability.  
 
To explain debt accumulation, we thus need to understand the decline in farm profits. There are 
two broad groups of reasons for the growing losses in CIS farms: internal farm-level reasons, and 
external policy-related reasons.  
 
The internal farm-level reasons are all related to the traditional collective farm structure, which 
basically did not change in CIS during the 1990s:  
 
  The farm enterprises did not reduce their size to more manageable dimensions; 
  Farm managers remained committed to provide all members with jobs, regardless of cost-
efficiency considerations; 
  Farm enterprises were obliged to maintain the social infrastructure in the village, including 
the traditional free support to household plots; 
  Farm  operations  remained  largely  production  oriented,  with  no  overriding  emphasis  on 
markets, consumers, and sales: farm managers remained production maximizers, not profit 
maximizers; 
  Member-workers continued to function in a traditional collective environment, without any 
direct accountability for the results of their effort or their contribution to profits and losses. 
 
All  these  internal  reasons  were  obstacles  to  improving  the  cost-efficiency  of  farms,  and 
necessarily lad to suboptimal profits. As long as CIS farms continued their strategy of formal 
reorganization, avoiding radical internal restructuring prescribed by market principles, they were 
not be able to improve their efficiency and profitability. 
   9 
External factors affecting profitability: The impact of government policies 
 
During the Soviet era, CIS farms were generally profitable. However, the example of farms in 
Novgorod, a typical non-chernozem zone oblast, demonstrates that this profitability was merely 
an illusion (Figure 3). In the past, the government traditionally injected massive subsidies into 
farm  enterprises,  which  compensated  them  for  low  product  prices  and  relatively  high  costs. 
Without subsidies, Novgorod farms were losing all through the early 1990s, and their reported 
profitability  was  sustained  entirely  by  subsidies.  Subsidization  of  agriculture  was  a  serious 
burden on the state budget, but this burden was deemed necessary to ensure low food prices for 
the  population.  After  1990,  however,  the  economic  and  political  environment  changed,  the 
subsidies all but disappeared, and without their masking effect the proportion of farms with 
losses increased dramatically. Today the farms face an entirely different set of external factors 
linked  with  government  policies,  which  have  a  very  strong  impact  on  profitability.  Without 
subsidies, farms became unprofitable given the existing production structure and management 
strategy. In a market economy, farms must actively respond to reduction in government support 
by changing their objectives, by restructuring their operations, by reorganizing and realigning 
with market principles to achieve greater cost efficiency and eventually return to profitability.  
 
With the elimination of producer subsidies, the main external policy-related factor that continued 
to depress farm profits in CIS was the government policy of maintaining low food prices for the 
population. While prices for manufactured commodities, including farm inputs and machinery, 
had been liberalized and brought to world market levels, the prices received by farms remained 
low. Deteriorating terms of trade for agriculture are a universal phenomenon observed in all 
market  economies.  Farms  in  market  economies  respond  to  deteriorating  terms  of  trade  by 
reducing their costs and increasing the output, i.e., improving their productivity and efficiency. 
As long as CIS farms fail to improve their productivity, they will continue to suffer from the 











Figure 3. Impact of subsidies on profit 
for farms in Novgorod Oblast (gray curve 




Thus, although external factors related to government policies certainly affect farm profitability, 
the ultimate solution to improving profits and reducing the burden of debt is basically internal. In 
response to changes in the economic and political environment, the farms must reorganize and 
Novgorod: Impact of Subsidies on Profit
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restructure for  greater cost  efficiency and higher productivity. This  is  what  farms  in  market 
economies do to remain profitable in a changing world. 
 
Who were main creditors of CIS farms? 
 
All through the 1990s, about half the farm debt came from the government and banks and the 
other half from supplier credit and wage arrears (Table 4). The exact role of the banks in the 
early years of the decade is unclear: some of the debt recorded as bank loans (especially long-
term  loans)  may  in  fact  have  been  government  debt  channeled  through  state  controlled 
agricultural banks. During the recent years, when the division between commercial banks and the 
government became much sharper and clearer than in the past, the share of bank lending in farm 
debt shrank to a minimum, and debt to the government became a dominant component.  
 
Table 4. Sources of farm debt: four CIS countries (excluding Kazakhstan) 
  1990  1994  1998 
Institutional credit  57  46  50 
     Commercial banks  39  19  7 
     Government  18  27  43 
Wage arrears  21  22  16 
Supplier credit  22  33  35 
 
Another clear feature in the development of farm debt over the last decade is the substantial 
increase in the share of suppliers’ credit, which nearly doubled from about 20% of total debt in 
the early 1990s to 40% in recent years (Table 4). This may be interpreted as a clear sign of 
progress toward commercial normalization of financial transactions in agriculture. Wage arrears 
are not and have never been a significant component of sources of farm credit. 
 
What could be done to resolve the farm debt problem?  
 
Accumulation of farm debt in CIS was caused by two sets of factors: external factors related to 
government policies that produced a non-conducive economic environment for farm operation, 
and internal factors related to farm organization and structure that led to low productivity and 
growing losses. Effective resolution of farm debt required addressing both sets of factors. 
 
The easiest and most obvious option for resolving farm debt would be to follow the practice of 
market  economies  and  the  experiences  of  some  countries  in  Central  Eastern  Europe  (e.g., 
Hungary and the Czech Republic). Insolvent farms would be declared bankrupt and go into 
liquidation,  clearing  the  stage  through  debt  restructuring  for  the  creation  of  new  financially 
viable units. Indeed, many experts recommended following this path in the CIS countries as well. 
However, the standard bankruptcy-based procedures could not offer a desired solution given the 
specific circumstances in the CIS. 
  A very large number of farms (in some countries more than 50%) were technically bankrupt 
in the sense that they reported losses and could not repay any debt; 
  The special structure of farm assets in relation to debt and the economic state of the farms 
made asset-driven debt restructuring difficult: farm fixed assets were grossly overvalued due 
to repeated indexing and not saleable;   11 
  There was little effective demand for the farm assets which may be offered to creditors in a 
liquidation process; 
  The status of land ownership was not clearly settled in most countries, and land generally had 
no value for debt settlement. 
  There were no effective bankruptcy courts, and very few bankruptcy cases had actually been 
brought to completion. 
 
Given the actual conditions in the CIS and the experience of all transition countries, the optimal 
approach to resolving farm debt had to start with the creation of an incentive system and a 
macro-policy  framework  for  agriculture  that  would  allow  efficient  agricultural  producers  to 
make profits and to invest. First, all remaining government intervention in agricultural markets 
had to be removed, farmers should be allowed to make their own production decisions, and 
prices for farm products should be set by free negotiation between producers and buyers. Internal 
and external trade restrictions and foreign exchange controls needed to be abolished. The freer 
the trade flows, the greater the benefit to everybody, including the farms. Governments do not 
have to withdraw from the markets as buyers, but governments must act on equally competitive 
terms with all others. If the government’s offer is sufficiently attractive, producers will sell to the 
government. Otherwise, it is in the national interest to let producers sell elsewhere.   
 
The history of farm debt in the CIS countries provides many examples of attempts to resolve the 
problem  of  farm  debt.  These  included  debt  write-offs,  moratoria,  debt  rescheduling  and 
restructuring. These attempts have not been successful.
8 They did not stop the accumulation of 
debt because they had been treating symptoms, and not the true causes of the problem. The 
conventional measures have not changed the macroeconomic and incentive framework around 
the farms, and they have left the inherited farming and ownership structure s intact. The key to 
the solution of the farm debt problem is improvement of the incentive framework combined with 
genuine restructuring and privatization of farms. It is only in the context of these external and 
internal institutional measures that a targeted resolution of farm debt is likely to succeed. 
 
Integration of debt settlement with farm restructuring: the experience of Moldova 
 
The linkage of debt settlement with farm restructuring and privatization offers many advantages 
under the current conditions in the CIS. An example of successful implementation of such an 
integrated program is provided by the experience of Moldova in 1998-2000, which resolved its 
farm debt problem not through blanket bankruptcy procedures, as some experts recommended at 
the time, but through a one-time comprehensive out-of-court debt settlement linked with farm 
restructuring and privatization. The framework for this integrated approach had the following 
main features: 
  The major objective of the one-time intervention was to create new farm entities that would 
be free of past debt burden and have the potential to become economically viable. The goal 
was not reorganization of existing enterprises, but actual creation of new entities compatible 
with market principles of operation. 
                                                 
8 They have not been successful in Israel either, as debt quickly returned to the original level (or higher) after each 
sporadic write-off or rescheduling attempt for a particular region or farm. See the section on the Israeli experience.   12 
  The decision to launch the debt settlement process in each farm enterprise and the choice of 
the form of the new entity was left to farm members. The decision-making process was 
supported  by  sufficient  information  outlining  in  detail  all  implications  and  alternatives, 
informing the members of the basic market principles of farm organization and management. 
  The  outstanding  debt  was  settled  primarily  from  the  assets  of  the  farm  enterprise.  Land 
remained outside the debt settlement procedure. The non-land assets were divided into three 
groups: (a) machinery and livestock, which was earmarked for distribution to farm members 
and was excluded from the process; (b) inventories, cash, receivables, other current assets, 
and  all  production  fixed  assets  (i.e.,  storage,  farm  buildings,  processing  facilities,  etc., 
excluding  housing  and  social  infrastructure),  which  were  used  for  settling  the  debt  of 
commercial  creditors;  (c)  social  assets  and  non-privatized  housing,  which  were  used  for 
settling the debt to the government and to payroll.  
  The debt settlement process was implemented with the full support of the government, and 
the budget was called upon as a last resort to reach a full settlement of all residual amounts 
remaining after the farm assets were exhausted. 
  The land, as well as farm machinery and livestock previously assigned to individuals in the 
form of property shares, were not subject to the debt settlement procedure. These assets 
remained in the hands of the individual farm members. To strengthen this guarantee, the first 
step of the debt settlement procedure included issue of legally binding land titles. 
  The wage arrears were settled by transfer of the non-privatized housing stock to individual 
farm members. In cases when the book value of the housing stock was insufficient to cover 
wage arrears, the previously calculated value of individual property shares was adjusted to 
reflect unpaid wages. 
  The debt to all state and government agencies was settled through transfer of social assets to 
local municipalities. If the social assets of a particular farm were not sufficient to cover the 
debt to the state, the residual was written off by the government. If the social assets exceeded 
the obligations, the balance of their book value was purchased by the municipalities with the 
aid of the state budget and the proceeds were used to repay other debt. 
  The full settlement of debt to commercial suppliers was an integral part of the process. All 
assets under lien were automatically transferred to the entitled creditors. The residual farm 
assets, excluding the portion distributed to farm members and used for settlement of wage 
arrears and government debt, was offered to the creditors up to the limit of the debt. The 
unsettled debt was taken over by the state budget and used as a future tax credit for the 
suppliers or converted into long-term bonds.
9  
  The process ended with the full liquidation of the old entity, without any legal successor, and 
registration of new entities by the former farm members.  
  The  process  had  a  clearly  specified  completion  date  for  each  farm  (four-five  months 
duration). The overall time frame for the entire project nationally was also set in advance. 
                                                 
9 The total debt assumed by the government was estimated at 325 million lei (US$26 million). Out of this amount, 
farms contributed 32% (103 million lei) by surrendering to the government their excess social assets and other 
redundant facilities. Private creditors absorbed 8% (25 million lei) through tax offset arrangements. The government 
had to issue bonds for the remaining 60% (197 million lei, or US$16 million), to be repaid over 5 years in amounts 
gradually raising from 10 million lei (less than US$1 million) in year 1 to 60 million lei (US$5 million) in year 5. 
See D. Dumbraveanu, R. Flick, A. Muravschi, S. Shapa, and C. Tanase, ―Moldova,‖ background paper for Farm 
Debt in CIS: A Multi-Country Study of Major Causes and Proposed Solutions, ECSSD Environmentally and 
Socially Sustainable Development Working Paper No. 27, September 2000, p. 26.   13 
Certain conditions were essential for the success of the framework implemented in Moldova in 
1998-2000: 
  legal framework for land ownership and titling was in place; 
  procedures for farm privatization had been adopted;  
  there was political consensus in favor of a complete and comprehensive approach to farm 
privatization and farm debt settlement; 
  the technical implementation was feasible (e.g., adequate donor support); 
 
The principles of the Moldova approach are valid for all CIS countries, including Tajikistan. 
The regional approach provides a solution even for the larger countries, such as Russia and 
Ukraine: comprehensive programs are to be implemented first in the most progressive regions. 
The experiences of the regional approach can be enlarged to a national program at a later stage.  
 
The most obvious indicator of success in farm restructuring and debt settlement is the future 
financial performance of the new restructured farms. The efforts to resolve the debt problem are 
not  finished  with  the  formal  elimination  of  past  debt.  First,  the  macro-economic  incentive 
framework  and  the  internal  farm  organization  must  ensure  that  farms  can  potentially  be 
profitable  and  viable.  Second,  a  working  bankruptcy  system  needs  to  be  put  into  place 
immediately  after  restructuring  and  debt  settlement.  Bankruptcy  procedures  need  to  be 
consistently and impartially enforced in the future to avoid accumulation of new debt and to 
facilitate further restructuring toward greater productivity and efficiency in the farming sector. 
The  experience  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  indicates  that  restructured  agriculture,  once 
relieved of the past debt burden, needs to be supported by a non-distortional transparent and 
efficiency-focused incentive system, as well as a well-designed government strategy to facilitate 
investments, achieve quality improvements, and enhance competitiveness. A discussion of these 
measures, however, goes far beyond the scope of the present paper. 
 
Resolution of the Farm Debt Crisis in Israel
10 
 
Unlike the CIS countries, Israel has always been a free market economy, although with a layer of 
government intervention superimposed. Government intervention was very strong in the 1950s 
and the 1960s, especially in agriculture and capital markets, but it has significantly declined over 
time. The government's goals in agriculture were and to a certain extent still are to support farm 
incomes, to improve food supply, and to maintain the rural population. 
 
The main feature that made the Israeli market agriculture similar to the CIS farm sector was the 
prevalence of soft budget constraints and moral hazard behavior. Over the years, the government, 
by its paternalistic behavior toward agriculture, created the impression that farm debt was secure 
                                                 
10 This section draws on the work carried out between 1988 and 1992 by Yoav Kislev, Zvi Lerman, and the late 
Pinhas Zusman at the Hebrew University in Israel (with partial support from the World Bank’s Agriculture and 
Rural  Development  Division).  It  relies  on  Y.  Kislev,  Z.  Lerman,  and  P.  Zusman,  ―Recent  Experience  with 
Cooperative Farm Credit in Israel,‖ Economic Development and Cultural Change, 39(4):773-789, July 1991; Y. 
Kislev, Z. Lerman, and P. Zusman, ―Cooperative Credit in Agriculture - The Israeli Experience,‖ in: K. Hoff, A. 
Braverman, and J. Stiglitz, The Economics of Rural Organization: Theory, Practice, and Policy, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1993, pp. 214-227; and an unpublished paper written by Yoav Kislev in 2001 regarding the 
experiences with agricultural cooperatives in Israel. 
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and that farms would not be allowed to fail. This encouraged banks to lend to agriculture without 
applying  the  standard  screening  measures  of  creditworthiness  and  repayment  capacity. 
Furthermore, farms themselves felt that they could take advantage of credit facilities to finance 
investment  and  even  consumption  without  regard  to  financial  prudency  as  long  as  the 
government  was  there  to  bail  them  out  in  an  emergency.  This  combination  of  soft  budget 
constraints and moral hazard led to extreme over-borrowing and was at the root of the Israeli 
farm crisis that erupted in the late 1980s. 
 
Government  policies  in  Israel  prior  to  the  mid-1980s  encouraged  over-borrowing  and  over-
investment and indirectly fueled the inflationary pressures. The government’s inevitable decision 
to  implement  essential  anti-inflationary  policies  after  1985  immediately  brought  the  lending 
spree to an end and caused the credit bubble to burst. The magnitude of the debt overhang put the 
entire agricultural sector at risk of default and required active involvement of the government in 
debt settlement negotiations.  
 
Cooperative structures in Israeli agriculture 
 
Agriculture in Israel is agriculture of cooperatives. Eighty percent of Israel's agricultural product 
comes from the cooperative sector, both family farms in moshavim and the collective kibbutzim. 
Cooperation in agriculture was encouraged by the government as a matter of national policy. 
Government’s paternalistic attitude created the general feeling – and not only among farmers − 
that it was the government's responsibility to maintain the welfare of the cooperative farming 
sector.   
 
The cooperative structure in Israel is basically organized on two levels: the local village level 
constituted by individual members in moshavim and kibbutzim and the regional level constituted 
by  the  first-level  cooperative  villages.  The  regional  cooperatives  are  supply  and  marketing 
cooperatives for moshavim and kibbutzim, including a system of regional processing enterprises. 
Zealous  support  of  rural  development  by  public  agencies,  easy  access  to  credit  through  the 
supply cooperatives, and strong political regional lobbies all resulted in overexpansion of most of 
the regional processing enterprises in the 1970s. Consequently, in the early 1980s, many service 





Israeli cooperatives – both the moshavim and the regionals – provided a wide range of input 
supply and product marketing services to their members. Yet the most important service they 
provided was financial intermediation. Farmland in Israel is nationally owned and moshavim and 
kibbutzim could not use it as collateral. Lack of collateral spurred the development of financial 
cooperation, which started as a simple mechanism for exploiting economies of scale to raise 
supplier credit and bank loans at beneficial terms for farmers. The supply cooperatives gradually 
expanded  into  full-scale  financial  intermediation,  raising  credit  from  both  suppliers  and 
                                                 
11 This section describes financial intermediation as it was practiced before the 1985 crisis. One of the consequences 
of the crisis has been a substantial reduction in the financial interconnections between cooperatives, especially 
among the moshavim. 
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commercial banks for the benefit of their members – the moshavim and the kibbutzim. The 
moshav in turn acted as a source of credit for its member-farmers by borrowing ―wholesale‖ 
from banks and lending to its members. Interlinkages between cooperative credit and marketing 
of farm products through the cooperative created the institutional guarantees for repayment that 
replaced collateral for loans in cooperative agriculture.  
 
In addition to credit–marketing interlinkages, the lack of collateral was overcome by a system of 
mutual  guarantee  arrangements  that  operated  on  several  levels.  All  members  of  a  moshav 
mutually guaranteed the loans that the moshav cooperative raised – for joint ventures or to be 
distributed to individual farms. Similarly, moshavim and kibbutzim were guarantors to loans 
their regional cooperative associations took. Thus, virtually all members – individual farmers, 
moshavim,  and  kibbutzim  –  were  parties  to  mutual  guarantee  arrangements  and  all  were 
mutually responsible for loans raised by their cooperatives.  
 
The purpose of mutual guarantees was to reduce the risk banks incurred in lending to cooperative 
farms  and  their  secondary  cooperatives.  Practical  experience  reduced  the  subjective  risk  as 
perceived by the creditors even further: again and again, particularly in the 1950s and the 1960s, 
the government bailed out kibbutzim and moshavim that had run into financial difficulties. The 
remedy by government intervention was not long-lasting, however. In many cases farmers and 
cooperatives returned to the same problems just several years after rescheduling. Nevertheless, 
the recurrence of these debt rescheduling episodes, sometimes general and sometimes specific to 
certain farms or regions, was one of the major reason for the widespread belief that agriculture 
would not be allowed to collapse. Banks were not only willing to lend to agriculture, but they 
were actually eager to have cooperatives among their clients. These factors created a dangerous 
combination of soft budget constraints, whereby farms were allowed to borrow without regard to 
repayment capacity, and moral hazard behavior, whereby farms were willing to take on more and 
more debt without regard to returns on investment. 
 
The consequences of inflation and negative interest rates 
 
Israel experienced a wave of galloping inflation in the mid-1970s, which accelerated steadily 
from a yearly rate of 12% in 1970 to nearly 500% on an annual basis in the first half of 1985. 
The rising prices in the 1970s-1980s were fueled by an expanding supply of credit, much of it 
imported from recycled petro dollars.  
 
As is common in inflationary environments, the nominal interest rates lagged behind inflation 
and the real rates remained consistently negative for more than a decade between 1974 and 1985. 
The negative real rates and easy access to credit encouraged overinvestment and discouraged 
saving.  The  secondary  regional  cooperatives  borrowed  easily  on  the  strength  of  mutual 
guarantees and channelled large volumes of credit to their members. Part of the debt financed 
investment in productive assets (often contributing to overcapacity), part financed housing and 
consumer durables, and part was spent to increase current consumption.  
 
The government had to intervene to halt the accelerating inflation.  The change of policy came 
on 1 July 1985 and inflation was quickly brought down from 500% to 20% per year. The new 
policy involved the introduction of strict monetary and fiscal measures: price increases were   16 
stopped, a severe credit squeeze was enforced, and interest on short-term credit was raised to 
unprecedented levels (up to 100% per annum). A great part of the credit channelled through the 
secondary cooperatives to kibbutzim and moshavim was short-term and it had to be rolled over 
at  the  new  high  rates.  No  business  could  survive  such  sky-rocketing  rates  and  most  of  the 
kibbutzim, moshavim, and regional cooperatives became insolvent almost overnight. By mid-
1986 it was clear that cooperative agriculture was in a deep financial crisis.  
 
The crisis reveals weaknesses inherent in the cooperative form of organization. Many businesses 
suffered  severely  when  economic  conditions  changed  with  the  introduction  of  the  anti-
inflationary policy in 1985, but it was only in agriculture that a whole sector − the cooperative 
sector − collapsed financially. Overborrowing had been driven by a combination of moral hazard 
and mutual liability arrangements, which could not be enforced when the need arose.    
 
The crisis  
 
The crisis erupted at the end of 1985 once creditors realized that agriculture could not service its 
debt because of the very high real interest rates and the unwillingness of the government to 
continue  bailing  out  the  sector.  Private  lenders  and  commercial  banks  refused  to  extend 
additional credit and insisted that loans be repaid. For most farmers, the heavy burden was not 
their own debt but their share of the mutual liabilities − their share in covering the debt of a small 
number of heavy borrowers in the moshav and the debt of the regional service enterprises. While 
the  crisis  was  triggered  by  the  anti-inflationary  policies  of  July  1985  and  took  the  form  of 
financial insolvency, it had deeper roots. Four interrelated problems surfaced at that time. 
 
a. Lack of control. Secondary cooperatives and associations in moshavim transferred credit to 
their  members  disregarding  the  ability  to  repay  loans  on  the  terms  received.  Members  in 
cooperatives,  who  mutually  guaranteed  loans  taken  by  their  associations,  did  not  exercise 
appropriate  control  over  the  actions  of  the  officers  running  their  financial  affairs.  Banks 
continued to extend credit even to cooperatives that could not demonstrate stable economic and 
financial standing. Banks and other agents continued to rely on the government’s implicit safety 
net and neglected sound financial practices. This lack of control is a facet of what is usually 
referred to as soft budget constraints in the context of financial behavior in transition countries. 
 
b. Diminished ideological commitment. Originally, members in moshavim, and particularly in 
kibbutzim, were highly motivated ideologically and strictly adhered to the cooperative norms. 
Once the State of Israel had been established and its economy stabilized, the national argument 
for cooperation lost its force, particularly with the second and third generations who took the 
moshav and the kibbutz for granted and did not have their parents’ devotion to the original 
ideology. Reduced ideological commitment led to a reduction in the adherence to old norms. 
Thus, members found it relatively easy to renege on the interlinkage arrangements promising to 
market all their products through the moshav association in repayment of the loans they had 
received.  Marketable  products  leaked  to  outside  marketing  channels,  and  the  moshav  debt 
remained unpaid. 
 
c. Moral hazard behavior and free riding. Ample credit supply, mutual guarantees, and reliance 
on the government to bail out failing cooperatives encouraged moral hazard behavior: farmers,   17 
cooperatives,  and  kibbutzim  readily  borrowed  to  finance  both  production  and  consumption 
investments even when repayment was uncertain.  
 
d. Poor economic performance. Easy credit and inadequate control led to overinvestment and 
hence to poor economic performance. Political and social considerations took precedence over 
efficiency  and  income.  Survival  was  deemed  secured  with  the  government  safety  net. 
Consequently, when inflation was halted and rates of interest rose, many of the cooperatives 
discovered  that  they  were  operating  at  a  loss.  Many  of  their  economic  activities  were 
unprofitable  and  the  debts  they  accumulated  were  enormous  and  rising  as  interest  charges 
continued to accrue. 
 
Agriculture could not repay or service its debt in full; the question was how to apportion the 
losses.  Once this had been realized, the government intervened in an effort to reach a negotiated 
debt settlement between the banks, on the one hand, and the moshavim and kibbutzim on the 
other.   
 
The debt settlement 
 
When the crisis erupted, most farmers in the moshavim and many of the kibbutzim found that 
either  they  were  heavily  in  debt  themselves  or  they  were  guarantors  of  debt  incurred  by 
otherstheir peers and especially the secondary regional cooperatives to which they belonged. 
Mutual guarantees were useless in circumstances of a system-wide collapse: nobody had the 
resources to repay anybody’s debt. The government found itself in a dilemma. On the one hand, 
it could not simply bail out the cooperatives as it had done previouslythe magnitude of the 
crisis was beyond the ability of the state budget and the public would not tolerate spending large 
sums of public money on the small farming sector. On the other hand, if unattended, the crisis 
could destroy cooperative agriculture and with it bring down three of Israel’s largest banks. The 
government had to step in. The question was how to allocate the losses and at the same time 
secure continued functioning of agriculture. 
 
The core of the debt settlement agreement reached in 1988 was a combination of partial writeoff 
with rescheduling based on ability to pay. The settlement consisted of two parts:  
  assessment of the income potential of the farms (―ability to pay‖) and rescheduling of the 
portion of debt judged to be repayable;  
  forgiveness of the debt that could not be repaid.  
 
Once the ability to pay had been assessed, it was decided in 1989-1990 to write off close to a 
third of the outstanding debt and reschedule the remainder for a period of 15-20 years. In the 
kibbutz sector, where the debt was larger than in the family farms in moshavim, the government 
absorbed approximately one-third of the writeoff; two-thirds of the writeoff was assumed by the 
banks and other creditors. The same principle of sharing between the government and the banks 
was applied to the written-off portion of the debt of moshavim, although the exact shares were 
different. 
 
Some numbers will help to visualize the magnitude of the task. By the estimates available in 
1988, agriculture’s debt was NIS 6.5 billion, and the value of net capital was then NIS 6 billion   18 
($4.1 billion and $3.8 billion respectively at NIS 1.6 to the dollar). By these figures agriculture 
had  negative  equity:  all  its  capital  was  financed  by  debt.  Erasing  a  third  of  the  debt  and 
rescheduling the remainder of NIS 4.3 million for a period of 20 years at 4.5% in real terms, the 
annuity would be NIS 331 million. This would be just possible to pay if agriculture continued to 
operate at the same level of profitability as in the 1970s, when operating profits were upward of 
NIS 300 million (in 1987 prices). If agriculture’s debt were actually repaid in this way, the sector 
would rebuild its equity over the next twenty  years. However, repayment was by no means 
guaranteed, because the profitability of agriculture was falling in the 1980s and shortfalls might 
have to be offset by efforts to increase efficiency (through restructuring) or by income generated 
from off-farm activities. 
 
The farm by farm implementation of the settlement agreements is not completed after twenty 
years, but the acute crisis atmosphere disappeared once the agreements had been signed. The 
immediate consequence of the crisis was a significant change in the financial environment facing 
cooperative  agriculture.  Kibbutzim  and  individual  farmers  in  moshavim  now  have  to  deal 
directly  with  commercial  banks;  they  cannot  rely  anymore  on  ―in-house‖  financial 
intermediaries, nor can they look to the government for rescue. Operating on national land, they 
cannot use land as collateral and credit is  now extended only to operators who demonstrate 
sound economic performance. Farmers have to show financial accountability and follow strict 
financial discipline, observing hard budget constraints. The new system does not tolerate moral 
hazard behavior and soft budget constraints are gone. 
 
The debt crisis experience of Israeli agriculture suggests that poor policy and bad institutions 
cause  considerable  damage.  This  is  particularly  true  for  the  cooperative  sector,  because  the 
dangers of  moral  hazard  and free riding  inherent  to  cooperatives  are  compounded when the 
government intervenes to relieve farmers of their accountability and commercial banks do not 
monitor the creditworthiness of the borrowers. A major responsibility therefore rests with the 
government and the lenders. The government must have the wisdom and the power to limit its 
involvement in agriculture, and let farmers be accountable for their actions. The lenders must 




Tajikistan, like many other CIS countries, is struggling with the problem of debt overhang in 
farms.  Many  of  the  CIS  countries  have  made  attempts  to  solve  the  problem  and  similar 
discussions have been going on in Tajikistan for a number of years now. However, the general 
lack of political will and the prevailing unwillingness to make radical changes in the core of the 
inherited collective structure have resulted in temporary ad hoc solutions in other CIS countries. 
Instead of treating the underlying causes, these ad hoc measures typically address the symptoms 
and actually lead to further deterioration of the rural financial situation, including demonetization 
of the farm sector. A similar indecisive ad hoc attitude prevailing in Tajikistan has blocked all 
possible progress toward farm debt resolution in this country. 
 
Table 5 outlines the main factors that emerge from our analysis  as the causes of farm debt 
accumulation.  To  resolve  the  farm  debt  problem  effectively,  governments  need  to  apply 
measures  that  address  the  combination  of  all  these  factors,  including  the  non-conducive   19 
economic  environment  of  the  farms  and  the  inherited  unproductive  internal  organization. 
Effective resolution of the farm debt problem will remove one of the major bottlenecks in the 
process of agricultural reform.  
 
Table 5. Major reasons for accumulation of farm debt 
  Tajikstan (1999-2007)  CIS countries (1990-1998)  Israel (1986-2000) 
Lack of farm 
profitability 
Farms unprofitable  Farms unprofitable  Low and declining 
profitability 
Organization  Collective dehkan farms, 
enterprises 








eliminates ―freedom to farm‖ 
Pervasive soft-budget 
constraints sustained 
Soft budget constraints, 
moral hazard (readiness of 





Disputed information on 
origin and levels of debt 
Disagreements between 
farm financial statements, 
bank records, and statistics  
Banks unable to explain 
interest and inflationary 
linkage accruals 
 
The  magnitude  and  breadth  of  the  cotton  farm  debt  problem  in  Tajikistan  rules  out  the 
application of standard bankruptcy-based resolution procedures. Instead the government should 
purposely look for non-bankruptcy mechanisms that will not damage the delicate social fabric of 
rural life. World experience suggests two examples that the government of Tajikistan should 
closely study: Moldova and Israel. The farm debt resolution program implemented in Moldova in 
1998-2000 engineered farm debt repayment through the sale of collectively owned assets to the 
government  and  compensation  of  commercial  creditors  with  long-term  government  bonds. 
Coming from a CIS country with a similar institutional heritage, this mechanism is particularly 
appropriate for application in Tajikistan. Israel rescued its heavily indebted farm sector in the 
1990s through a non-bankruptcy mechanism that forced banks, commercial creditors, and the 
government to share the burden of outstanding debt writeoffs and instituted strict monitoring 
tools to prevent accumulation of new debt. The Israeli experience is also relevant for Tajikistan. 
 